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Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem
Brannon P. Denning*
INTRODUCTION
Among the various branches of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine (DCCD)—the judge-made rules grounded in the
Constitution’s grant of power over interstate commerce to
Congress—is that which prohibits “extraterritorial” state legislation.
As recently as 1989, the Supreme Court held that the DCCD
“‘precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes
place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the
commerce has effects within the State.’”1
That broad articulation of the principle, however, represented
extraterritoriality’s high tide. The Court has since retreated; in 2003,
it seemed to limit the extraterritoriality principle dramatically,
rejecting arguments that a Maine prescription-drug subsidy program
actually attempted to fix prices outside the state.2 At this point, the
extraterritoriality principle looks to be quite moribund.
As Donald Regan noted during extraterritoriality’s heyday,
“[W]e do not understand the extraterritoriality principle . . . nearly as
well as we should.”3 While Regan believed it was a constitutional
principle, he rejected the notion that extraterritoriality had anything
to do with the DCCD.4 The Court apparently agreed.
This Article, then, is an autopsy of sorts. Assuming, as I do, that
extraterritoriality—at least the strong form articulated by the Court
Copyright 2013, by BRANNON P. DENNING.
* Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. Ben Barton
read an early draft and made excellent suggestions for improving the piece.
Robbie McNaughton provided excellent research assistance. Special thanks to
Christina Sautter and the editors of the Louisiana Law Review for both the
opportunity to contribute this essay, as well as for the editors’ skillful edits.
1. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
For articles on extraterritoriality generally, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O.
Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785
(2001); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State
Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865 (1987); Peter C. Felmly, Comment, Beyond
the Reach of States: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State
Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467 (2003).
2. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Ass’n v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
3. Regan, supra note 1, at 1884.
4. Id. at 1888 (arguing that early cases demonstrate that “the
extraterritoriality principle does not flow from the dormant commerce clause”).

980

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

in the 1980s—is dead, and unlikely to be revived by the current
Court, its passing offers an opportunity to examine the lifecycle of
constitutional doctrine, from birth to death.5 Kermit Roosevelt has
argued that doctrine and doctrinal rules can suffer from
“calcification” that causes courts to alter those rules or discard them
altogether.6 Close study may reveal information about what, exactly,
the Court sought through the doctrine’s development and
enforcement and why the Court ultimately abandoned it.
In Part I, I describe extraterritoriality’s early emergence. In its
early form, extraterritoriality was not exclusively yoked to the
DCCD. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
also cited as a source of the extraterritoriality doctrine, as were less
clause-bound structural principles. Beginning in the early twentieth
century, however, the doctrine became closely linked with the
DCCD; it emerged as a robust branch of the DCCD in the 1980s.
This association is described in Part II. Extraterritoriality’s decline is
detailed in Part III. In Part IV, I return to the question of what
“killed” extraterritoriality. I conclude that extraterritoriality’s demise
was likely overdetermined. Factors contributing to the doctrine’s
demise include what Kermit Roosevelt calls a “loss of fit” between
the doctrine and the purposes of the DCCD generally, as well as the
doctrine’s calcification; the lack of a limiting principle that would
prevent it from curtailing legitimate state regulatory power; the
Court’s decision to locate limits on punitive damage awards in the
Due Process Clause after flirting with the notion that those limits
grew out of DCCD extraterritoriality; and the Court’s apparent shift
away from robust enforcement of the DCCD generally to limitation
of the doctrine. In Part V, I consider the impact of
extraterritoriality’s demise on a related doctrine: the Court’s
periodic invalidation of state laws that presented the problem of
“inconsistent state regulations.” A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE EARLY HISTORY OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The concern with “territoriality”—ensuring that a state did not
exceed its legitimate legislative jurisdiction—was long a concern of
5. I accept as descriptively accurate Mitchell Berman’s “two-outputs thesis”
that the Supreme Court, when it interprets the Constitution, first establishes
“constitutional operative propositions”—what the Constitution requires or
prohibits—by interpreting the document, then operationalizes those propositions
by crafting “decision rules” that it then applies to facts to produce judgments. See
generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1
(2004). I will employ Professor Berman’s terminology throughout this Article.
6. Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes
What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1693 (2005).
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public international law.7 By the early twentieth century, it assumed
domestic importance in conflicts-of-laws disputes as well.8 Courts
assumed that “regulation of extraterritorial conduct was . . .
illegitimate”9 and devised various tests to resolve conflicts between
legal regimes of different states.10 Initially, however, the
constitutional bases for the extraterritoriality principle were the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of Article IV, not the DCCD.11 Extraterritoriality as a
DCCD problem can be traced to the Court’s 1852 decision in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens.12
In Cooley, Justice Curtis attempted to resolve the stalemate that
had developed on the Court among those who thought the
Commerce Clause had some independent preemptive effects on
state legislation and those who believed that state regulations of
interstate commerce were preempted only when they conflicted with
an affirmative act of Congress.13 Curtis’s gambit was to ignore the
question of whether the Commerce Clause conferred exclusive
power in favor of focusing on the subject of regulation. In his
formulation, those subjects that were national in nature and required
a single, uniform rule were beyond the regulatory power of states.
On the other hand, states were competent to regulate “local” subjects
that could tolerate myriad regulatory schemes.14
7. Austin Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1463–64 (2008) (terming territoriality a “defining feature”
of public international law). See also Willis Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1979).
8. See generally WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 94–95 (3d ed. 2002).
9. Parrish, supra note 7, at 1465; Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594
(1881) (“No State can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.”).
10. Originating with Joseph Story and continuing to influence the work of
Joseph Beal and the First Restatement, Conflict of Laws, was the “vested rights”
theory “based on the idea that at the moment a cause of action arises, rights vest
according to the law of the place where the crucial event occurred.” RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 56. This strict territorial approach has been displaced
by the Second Restatement’s “general principle that the law of the state with the
‘most significant relationship’ to a transaction should control.” Id. Another
influential approach, pioneered by Brainerd Currie, “argued that the choice-of-law
process should focus on the policies behind state substantive law rules; whether a
rule should be applied should depend upon whether the policy underlying that rule
would be advanced by its application.” Id.
11. Id. at § 94 (“Historically, the most important provisions in [choice-of-law
disputes] have been the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article Four.”).
12. 53 U.S. 299 (1852).
13. See generally 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836–64, at 357–95 (1974).
14. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319.
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But Curtis provided no criteria by which one could determine
whether the subject of legislation was national or local, so the Court
devised another set of decision rules. State laws regulating interstate
commerce directly were invalidated, while those regulating
commerce only indirectly were permitted.15 The terms direct and
indirect roughly corresponded to Cooley’s national and local
subjects, respectively. Extraterritorial regulations and taxes were
regarded as impermissible direct regulations of interstate commerce
and struck down.
In Western Union Telegraph Company v. Brown,16 for example,
the Court invalidated a South Carolina state court award arising out
of a statutory cause of action for mental anguish imposed on a
telegraph company for failure to deliver a telegram in Washington,
D.C. While the Court seemed to hold that the judgment was a
violation of the defendant’s due process rights, it added that
the act also is objectionable in its . . . attempt to regulate
commerce among the states. That is . . . it attempts to
determine the conduct required of the telegraph company in
transmitting a message from one state to another or to this
District by determining the consequences of not pursuing
such conduct . . . .17
For support, the Court cited Western Union Telegraph Company v.
Pendleton,18 in which the Court invalidated the application of an
Indiana law requiring telegrams to be delivered in the order received
to a telegram transmitted from Indiana to Iowa. “[T]he attempted
regulation by Indiana of the mode in which messages sent by
telegraphic companies doing business within her limits shall be
delivered in other states,” the Court wrote, “is an impediment to the
freedom of that form of interstate commerce, which is . . . beyond
the power of Indiana to interpose . . . .”19
Bernard Gavit, author of an early treatise on the Commerce
Clause, complained that such cases ought to be decided under the
Due Process Clause. “A rule of law which purports to affect conduct
outside of the state is void, and in truth no rule. . . . It is beyond the
15. The Court’s cases during this period are surveyed by Barry Cushman’s
excellent article, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000). See also Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 437–40
(2008) (discussing the direct–indirect test).
16. 234 U.S. 542 (1914).
17. Id. at 547.
18. 122 U.S. 347 (1887).
19. Id. at 358.
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power of a state to so impose its authority beyond its own limits.”20
In those cases, “the decision should be made . . . under the
Fourteenth Amendment and not under the Commerce Clause,” he
argued.21 He went on to write, “It can well be argued . . . that it is no
rule, and therefore no regulation. The Commerce Clause ought
never to be reached.”22
Indeed, until the Court decided Quill Corporation v. North
Dakota,23 the Court relied on both the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses to limit states’ ability to exercise taxing jurisdiction over
nonresidents. In many cases, the decisions did not clearly distinguish
between the two clauses.24 The theory was that under the Due
Process Clause the state lacked sufficient minimum contacts with
certain taxpayers to compel them to pay taxes. As for the Commerce
Clause, the early understanding was that interstate commerce qua
interstate commerce was immune from state taxation because to tax
interstate commerce was to directly regulate it.25
Concerns lingered about the ability of states to regulate interstate
commerce beyond their borders, namely, exposing commerce to
conflicting regulatory regimes, perhaps enabling a state to set a de
facto national standard by legislating more strictly than its neighbors
and incentivizing interstate commercial actors to comply with the
strictest standard. The Pendleton Court, for example, observed that
the purpose of the Commerce Clause was “to secure, with reference
to its subjects, uniform regulations, where such uniformity is
practicable, against conflicting state legislation.”26 It noted that
“[s]uch conflicting legislation would inevitably follow with
reference to telegraphic communications between citizens of

20. BERNARD C. GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 185 (AMS Press 1970) (1930).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
24. See, e.g., Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753
(1967) (holding that both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause
prevent the state from exercising taxing jurisdiction over a mail-order house with
no physical presence in the state); GAVIT, supra note 20, at 372 (“There seems to
be no difference in result whether a property tax is tested by the Fourteenth
Amendment or by the Commerce Clause.”).
25. 1 JEROME HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE
TAXATION ¶ 4.03[1] (3d ed. 1998 & 2012 Supp.) (noting that the Court formerly
embraced the view that “direct taxes on interstate commerce violated the
Commerce Clause” and that the prohibition on “direct taxes” included a ban on
taxing goods in transit in interstate commerce).
26. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 358 (1887).
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different states, if each state was vested with power to control them
beyond its own limits.”27
Despite its gradual replacement by both the antidiscrimination
principle and by the balancing of benefits and burdens for
nondiscriminatory, nontax regulations,28 the direct–indirect test
proved surprisingly durable, lasting into the 1930s. It was clear by
then that the Court regarded extraterritorial regulation as a
quintessential “direct” burden on interstate commerce. In Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,29 Justice Cardozo, for a unanimous Court, struck
down a New York statute that banned the in-state sale of out-of-state
milk unless the price paid for the imported milk was equal to New
York’s minimum price. “New York,” Cardozo wrote, “has no power
to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be
paid in that state for milk acquired there.”30 Cardozo concluded that
the prohibition was the functional equivalent of regulating prices in
other states.31 And that, he added, was precisely the sort of “‘direct[]
burden . . . of interstate business’” that the Commerce Clause
prohibited states from imposing.32
A half-century later, for about a decade, the Supreme Court built
on Justice Cardozo’s statement in Baldwin, articulating a rather
sweeping extraterritoriality principle with far-reaching implications.
Those cases demonstrate the Court’s continued concern with
conflicting regulatory regimes and impermissible extraterritorial
projections of state power.
II. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE EXTRATERRITORIALITY COMES OF
AGE33
In the previous Part, I argued that in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the Court sought to cabin states’ legislative,
taxing, and judicial jurisdiction. While many of these limits were
located in the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause played a
role, too. In many cases, moreover, courts took no particular care to
carefully distinguish which clause was doing what work. Describing

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
This evolution is described in Denning, supra note 15, at 443–48.
294 U.S. 511 (1935).
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id. at 522.
Parts II and III draw from BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.08[E] (2d ed. 2013).
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nineteenth century judges, Michael Greve once quipped that while
the judges were formalists, they were not clause-bound formalists.34
By the 1980s, the Due Process Clause ceased to operate as much
of a restraint on states’ exercises of either personal jurisdiction35 or
legislative jurisdiction in choice-of-law cases.36 In 1992, the Court
would hold that “minimum contacts” sufficed to create a proper
nexus between a taxpayer and a taxing state.37 During that same
time, moreover, the Court abandoned its previous holding that direct
taxation of interstate commerce was a violation of the Commerce
Clause.38 In 1977, the Court decided the seminal Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady,39 in which it announced a four-part test for
state and local taxes.40 Two of Complete Auto’s factors—substantial
nexus and apportionment—directly addressed concerns about
extraterritorial exercises of taxing jurisdiction and the dangers of
multiple taxation.
34. Personal communication with the author. See also DAN T. COENEN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 272 n.55 (2004) (“The
relationship between due-process and dormant Commerce Clause requirements
with regard to state regulatory programs is not well-developed.”).
35. See, e,g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(holding that due process is satisfied for exercising jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the jurisdiction]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice’” (citations omitted)).
36. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (holding
that to apply its law a “[s]tate must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,
486 U.S. 717 (1988) (applying Hague); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797 (1985) (applying Hague). The trilogy is discussed in RICHMAN & REYNOLDS,
supra note 8, § 97, at 301–10. The authors conclude that “Allstate shows that not
much is needed to satisfy the Court, at least as long as there is some ‘real’
connection with the litigation.” Id. at 309.
37. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 304 (1992) (overruling in part
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)). The
Court declined, however, to overrule that portion of National Bellas Hess holding
that the Commerce Clause required a physical presence to satisfy the Clause’s
“substantial nexus” requirement, at least for the collection and remittance of sales
taxes. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314; COENEN, supra note 34, at 272 n.55 (“In at least
some state tax cases . . . the so-called nexus limitation developed under the
dormant Commerce Clause has been given a longer reach than the
extraterritoriality restriction imposed by the Due Process Clause.”).
38. See Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
39. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
40. Under the now-canonical test, state and local taxes on interstate
commerce are valid if (1) there is a substantial nexus between the taxpayer and the
taxing state; (2) the tax is apportioned; (3) the tax is nondiscriminatory; and (4) the
tax is fairly related to benefits provided the taxpayer. Id. at 277–78.
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Were it not for a series of cases in the 1980s, then, what I will
hereafter term DCCD extraterritoriality would likely have “come to
[an] arid end[]”41 as had many other decision rules in this area. This
line of cases revived the concept, at least temporarily, until the Court
essentially abandoned it in 2003.
A. Edgar v. MITE Corporation
In 1982, the Court invalidated an Illinois antitakeover statute in
Edgar v. MITE Corporation42 that required registration of takeover
offers of corporations in which Illinois citizens owned more than
10% of the shares; or in which two of the following conditions
obtained: (1) the target corporation’s principal place of business was
located in Illinois; (2) it was organized under the laws of Illinois; or
(3) 10% of its capital was located in the state.43 Following
registration, the Illinois Secretary of State had 20 days during which
he could hold a hearing to evaluate the offer’s fairness. A hearing
was mandatory if requested by a majority of the firm’s outside
directors or by Illinois citizens owning 10% of the class of securities
subject to the takeover.44 While the Court declined to find the
Illinois law preempted by federal law,45 it gave alternative reasons
why the act violated the DCCD.
In a plurality opinion, Justice Byron White argued that by
regulating transactions occurring outside of its borders, the Illinois
Act had impermissible extraterritorial effects. “The Illinois Act,”
White noted, “directly regulates transactions which take place across
state lines, even if wholly outside the State of Illinois.”46 He
continued, “It is therefore apparent that the Illinois statute is a direct
restraint on interstate commerce and that it has a sweeping
extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, if Illinois may impose such
regulations, so may other States; and interstate commerce in
securities transactions generated by tender offers would be
thoroughly stifled.”47
By contrast, an Indiana antitakeover statute regulating only
entities incorporated in Indiana was upheld five years later in CTS
Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of America.48 The Indiana
41. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS 100–01 (1957).
42. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
43. Id. at 627.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 631–40.
46. Id. at 641.
47. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion).
48. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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statute conditioned “acquisition of control of a corporation on approval
of a majority of the pre-existing disinterested shareholders.”49
Reaffirming the connection between extraterritoriality and inconsistent
state regulation, the Court cited prior cases for the proposition that the
Court had applied the DCCD to invalidate “statutes that may
adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to
inconsistent regulations” but added that was not the case here.50 “So
long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it
has created,” the Court wrote, “each corporation will be subject to the
law of only one State.”51 Justice White, dissenting, echoed his
plurality opinion in MITE Corporation, complaining that the Indiana
Act “directly regulat[ed] the purchase and sale of shares of stock in
interstate commerce” and was therefore unconstitutional.52
B. The Price Affirmation Cases
Around the same time, the Court invalidated two “price
affirmation” statutes that required wholesalers of alcoholic
beverages to file price schedules with state regulators and sell their
products in other states no cheaper than the prices declared on the
schedules.53 The Court found both laws to have impermissible
extraterritorial effects.
In the first case, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Authority, the distiller had run afoul of New York’s
price affirmation statute by offering cash “promotional allowances”
to its wholesalers nationwide.54 New York wholesalers, however,
could not legally accept those allowances under state law, so
regulators charged that the “effective price” of New York liquor was
higher than that in other states where the payments were permitted.55
Justice Marshall wrote that while a state can “seek lower prices for
its consumers, it may not insist that producers or consumers in other
States surrender whatever competitive advantages they may
possess.”56 The Court focused its inquiry “on whether New York’s
49. Id. at 73–74 (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 88.
51. Id. at 89; see also id. at 93 (“We agree that Indiana has no interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations. But this Act
applies only to corporations incorporated in Indiana.”).
52. Id. at 99 (White, J., dissenting).
53. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (divided court) (invalidating
Connecticut price affirmation statute for beer); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (divided court) (invalidating New
York price affirmation statute for liquor).
54. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 578.
55. Id. at 576–77.
56. Id. at 580.
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affirmation law regulates commerce in other States.”57 It concluded
that it did, adding that “[f]orcing a merchant to seek regulatory
approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another
directly regulates interstate commerce”58 and was prohibited by the
DCCD.
Extraterritoriality hit its high water mark three years later in
Healy v. The Beer Institute, in which the Court struck down a
Connecticut price affirmation statute that applied to beer sales in
Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island.59 The Court declared
that Brown-Forman reaffirmed and elaborated “our established view
that a state law that has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce
occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the
Commerce Clause.”60 Justice Blackmun synthesized the Court’s
extraterritoriality cases, concluding that
[t]aken together, our cases concerning the extraterritorial
effects of state economic regulation stand at a minimum for
the following propositions: First, the “Commerce Clause . . .
precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that
takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or
not the commerce has effects within the State,” and,
specifically, a State may not adopt legislation that has the
practical effect of establishing “a scale of prices for use in
other states.” Second, a statute that directly controls
commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a
State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s
authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute’s
extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature. The
critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the
regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the
State. Third, the practical effect of the statute must be
evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the
statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged
statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of
other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many
or every, State adopted similar legislation. Generally
speaking, the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent

Id.

57. Id. That conclusion followed the Court’s discussion of the Baldwin case.

58. Id. at 582. In addition, the Court continued to link extraterritoriality and
exposure to inconsistent regulations. Id. at 583 (noting that the “proliferation of
state affirmation laws . . . has greatly multiplied the likelihood that a seller will be
subjected to inconsistent obligations in different States”).
59. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 326 (1989) (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 332.
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legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory
regime into the jurisdiction of another State. And,
specifically, the Commerce Clause dictates that no State may
force an out-of-state merchant to seek regulatory approval in
one State before undertaking a transaction in another.61
Justice Blackmun concluded that the Connecticut statute was
“indistinguishable” from the New York statute invalidated in
Brown-Forman and struck it down.62 Extraterritoriality seemed to
stall after Healy, though in 1996 the Court again invoked the
principle as part of BMW v. Gore’s63 limit on the ability of states to
impose punitive damages for conduct occurring outside the state.
C. BMW v. Gore: Extraterritoriality’s Indian Summer
When a Birmingham, Alabama, doctor discovered that his new
BMW had been damaged, repaired, and repainted prior to sale as
“new,” he sued, claiming that nondisclosure of the presale damage
constituted fraud.64 A state court jury agreed, awarding the plaintiff
$4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive
damages. The measure of the punitive damages was the total
number of cars repaired, repainted, and sold as new around the
country multiplied by $4,000—the reduction in the car’s value
caused by the repainting.65 The Alabama Supreme Court later
reduced the punitive damage award to $2 million.66
Before concluding that even the reduced award violated the Due
Process Clause,67 however, the United States Supreme Court noted
that the jury computed the award based on conduct occurring in
other states, including states in which the conduct would not have
been illegal.68 The laws concerning deceptive trade practices were,
the Court observed, “a patchwork of rules representing the diverse
policy judgments of lawmakers in 50 States.”69 Reasonable
legislators could—and did—disagree about the level of disclosure
required in situations like the one at issue. But, absent a national
standard issued from Congress, each state was entitled to define
61. Id. at 335–37 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 339. Alternatively, Justice Blackmun found that the law was
discriminatory because only wholesalers that engaged in interstate commerce
needed to file the price schedule with the state. Id. at 340.
63. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 564.
66. Id. at 567.
67. Id. at 574–86.
68. Id. at 568–74.
69. Id. at 570.
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fraud for itself. “[N]o single State could . . . impose its own policy
choice on neighboring States.”70 Citing Healy and MITE, the Court
concluded that “principles of state sovereignty and comity [dictate]
that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its
laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in
other States.”71
Was BMW v. Gore an extraterritoriality case with DCCD
implications? Professor Tribe thought so. In the third edition of his
treatise, he cited the case as “underscor[ing]” the “sweep of the
principle” announced in Healy.72 Gore did not mark a rebirth of
DCCD extraterritoriality, however. In 2003, the Court retreated
from Healy’s broad pronouncements and largely restricted earlier
cases to their facts. In that same term, moreover, the Court
abandoned Gore’s suggestion that the DCCD was the source of
constitutional limits on punitive damages and instead identified the
Due Process Clause as the sole source of those limits.73
III. THE DEATH OF A DOCTRINE
The retrenchment occurred in Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America v. Walsh.74 Maine passed a series of laws
intended to bring down the price of prescription drugs. Part of the
plan required drug manufacturers (none of which were located in
Maine) to enter into rebate agreements with the state. Under these
agreements, the manufacturers would rebate money to the state for
drugs dispensed through its Medicaid program in exchange for
avoiding a costly “preauthorization” process before drugs would be
prescribed to state Medicaid patients. That money would then
subsidize the sale of discount drugs to Maine citizens through a new
state program (the “Maine Rx Plan”).75
The petitioners claimed that the “voluntary” rebate agreements
had an impermissible extraterritorial effect. First, citing the holdings
of Healy, et al., that states may not regulate transactions occurring in
other states, the petitioners argued that “Maine mandates payments
70. Id. at 571.
71. Id. at 572 (footnote omitted).
72. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1078 n.21 (3d
ed. 2000).
73. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
See also infra notes 134–39 and accompanying text.
74. 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
75. Id. at 653–54. For a more detailed description of the Maine Rx program,
see Brannon P. Denning, The Maine Rx Prescription Drug Plan and the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Case of the Missing Link[age], 29 AM. J.L. &
MED. 7, 9–10 (2003).
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from manufacturers whose only transactions leading to the
pharmacy counter are with wholesalers. To the extent that those
sales occur outside Maine—and virtually all manufacturers’ sales
do—Maine cannot mandate the Maine Rx payments consistent with
the Commerce Clause.”76 Second, the petitioners analogized the
rebate to a sales tax and argued that it could not survive application
of the Court’s Complete Auto test.
At a minimum, the Maine Rx program would fail the first of
the Complete Auto elements. The Maine Rx rebate “taxes”
drug manufacturers when third parties sell the
manufacturers’ products in Maine. While Maine clearly has
the authority to tax in-state retail pharmaceutical sales, and
may tax either the individual purchasers or the Maine-based
pharmacies that sell drugs manufactured by PhRMA’s
members, it may not require out-of-state manufacturers who
are strangers to the instate retail transactions to bear the costs
of this activity. Thus, if Maine purports to tax the only
“activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state” (i.e.,
the retail sales), it may not impose this liability on out-ofstate entities that are not involved in or responsible for that
in-state activity.
Alternatively, if Maine purports to be taxing the “activity” of
manufacturers—namely, wholesale sales—the Maine Rx
rebate requirement even more obviously fails Complete
Auto’s nexus requirement. Maine may not require out-ofstate manufacturers to pay sales taxes on out-of-state
wholesale transactions that have no relationship to the state
of Maine.77
The Court—in the portion of its opinion addressing the DCCD
challenge—unanimously disagreed:
[U]nlike price control or price affirmation statutes, “the Maine
Act does not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction,
either by its express terms or by its inevitable effect. Maine
does not insist that manufacturers sell their drugs to a
wholesaler for a certain price. Similarly, Maine is not tying
the price of its in-state products to out-of-state prices.”78

76. Brief for Petitioners at 28, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon,
538 U.S. 644 (2003) (No. 01-188), 2002 WL 31120844.
77. Id. at 32.
78. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669.
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The Court did not mention Healy’s statement that the “critical
inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”79 No mention whatever
was made of MITE and its concern about the “direct” regulation of
out-of-state conduct.
In the years since Walsh, lower courts have generally restricted
extraterritoriality along the lines suggested by the Court’s narrow
reading of its previous cases. Generally speaking, lower courts tend to
invalidate statutes (1) when there are Brown-Forman- or Healy-like
price controls linking prices in the regulating jurisdiction to those
charged elsewhere;80 (2) where it is clear that a statute seeks to enable
State A to control activities occurring in State B, or to use Baldwin’s
phrase, where State A is “projecting” its legislation into State B;81

79. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (plurality opinion).
80. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 406 F.
Supp. 2d 56, 67–71 (D.D.C. 2005) (striking down a D.C. statute making it
unlawful for drug manufacturers “to sell or supply for sale or impose minimum
resale requirements for a patented prescription drug that results in the prescription
drug being sold in the District for an excessive price” and which provides that a
prima facie case for excessiveness could be made out where the wholesale price of
a drug sold in D.C. was 30% higher than comparable price of drug sold in the
United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, or Australia and holding that the ordinance
had an impermissible extraterritorial effect). But see Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v.
Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting arguments that Maine statute
barring automobile manufacturers from recouping costs associated with other law
requiring retail-rate reimbursements to dealers for repairs made under warranty
from in-state automobile dealers had impermissible extraterritorial effects in
noting that “the Alliance has not provided any other, more reliable proof of the
price-tying allegedly associated with the recoupment bar”).
81. See, e.g., Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660, 668–69 (7th
Cir. 2010) (opinion by Judge Posner invalidating state application of consumer
credit code to out-of-state car title lender making loans to state’s citizens);
Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1142 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (holding that state right of publicity statute that regulated
“a variety of transactions occurring ‘wholly outside’ Washington’s borders”
violated the extraterritoriality principle); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv.
Litig., 755 F. Supp. 2d 857, 887 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (holding that application of
state blue sky laws to transaction occurring wholly outside the state violated the
extraterritoriality prong of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine); cf. Knoll
Pharm. Co. v. Sherman, 57 F. Supp. 2d 615, 622–24 (E.D. Ill. 1999) (striking
down Illinois law prohibiting the advertisement, within the state, of an FDAapproved weight-loss drug and holding that compliance with the advertising ban
was not possible without the cessation of the national advertising campaign). But
see S. Union Co. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 289 F.3d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting the claim that the law requiring administrative approval for stock
purchases of other utility companies, regardless of whether they operated in the
state, violated the extraterritoriality principle).
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and (3) in certain cases dealing with early state regulation of the
Internet.82
By contrast, lower courts have rejected extraterritoriality
arguments brought by manufacturers whose products must be
labeled in a particular way before being sold in a state, even if
compliance with the state law would require changes in their out-ofstate manufacturing processes.83 Similarly, it is not impermissible
extraterritorial legislation to require out-of-state sellers to comply
with state law when vending their products in the regulating state.84
And in a variety of other circumstances the courts have made clear
that extraterritoriality is not an all-purpose deregulatory tool
allowing interstate companies to escape the reach of state legislators
and regulators where they do business, even though compliance
causes effects that are felt beyond the regulating jurisdiction.85
82. Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102–04 (2d Cir. 2003)
(striking down Vermont’s statute governing sexually explicit content on the
Internet and concluding that the statute constituted impermissible extraterritorial
regulation); Se. Booksellers Ass’n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 786, 787
(D.S.C. 2005) (invalidating the South Carolina statute prohibiting dissemination of
material “harmful to minors” over the Internet because the act “regulat[es]
commerce occurring wholly outside of South Carolina” (citation omitted)); Ctr.
for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 662 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(striking down the state law requiring Internet service providers to remove or
disable access to child pornography either stored on or available through its
service and noting that the Act “has the practical effect of exporting
Pennsylvania’s domestic policies” (citation omitted)). But see Simmons v. State,
944 So. 2d 317, 329–35 (Fla. 2006) (upholding a conviction under state statutes
prohibiting electronic mail transmission of material that is harmful to one known
to be a minor living in the state and luring or enticing a child through electronic
means against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge in holding that the
transmission statute did not regulate extraterritorially); Goldsmith & Sykes, supra
note 1 (criticizing the use of extraterritoriality to invalidate state Internet
regulations).
83. See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 647 (6th Cir.
2010) (rejecting an extraterritoriality challenge to a state regulation curbing
allegedly misleading labeling of dairy products with regard to nonuse of
antibiotics or growth hormones); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104,
110 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff’s “extraterritoriality contention fails
because the statute does not inescapably require manufacturers to label all lamps
wherever distributed”).
84. See, e.g., SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 192–95 (2d Cir.
2007) (rejecting the argument that the Connecticut law regulating prepaid, stored
value gift cards regulated extraterritorially) (“SPGGC fails to allege any facts
tending to show . . . how the effects of the Gift Card Law might be projected into
other states. . . . [T]he Gift Card Law does not, by its terms or its effects, directly
regulate sales of gift cards in other states.”).
85. See, e.g., Quik Payday, Inc. v. Stork, 549 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir.
2008) (rejecting the argument that the application of the state consumer credit
code to an Internet payday lender violated the extraterritoriality principle); Wine &
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Courts will also supply a saving construction to prevent a state
statute from having impermissible extraterritorial effects.86

Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting
a DCCD attack on state liquor laws prohibiting liquor franchises and franchisetype business activities by liquor licensees in holding that the statutes did not
regulate extraterritorially); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294,
310–312 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the Maine act requiring pharmacy benefit
managers to act as fiduciaries for their clients and imposing specific duties on
them, including disclosure of conflicts and of financial arrangements with
pharmaceutical manufacturers, did not have impermissible extraterritorial effects
in holding that the act did not attempt to control out-of-state activities); Freedom
Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting cigarette
importers’ arguments that the New York contraband statute operated with
impermissible extraterritorial effects); Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int’l
Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219, 1223–25 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the state statute
protecting equipment dealers did not operate with impermissible extraterritorial
reach with respect to the contract between the parties that supported the California
choice of law and noting that the statute “only applies to this case because the
parties chose to be governed by California law”); Bostain v. Food Express, Inc.,
153 P.3d 846, 854–56 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (rejecting a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge to the state minimum wage act as applied to an interstate trucker
who worked part of his hours outside the state); Kearney v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 921–922 (Cal. 2006) (concluding that the application
of California privacy law in a conflict-of-law case involving conduct occurring in
Georgia and California would not violate the dormant Commerce Clause)
(“[A]pplication of the California law here at issue would affect only a business’s
undisclosed recording of telephone conversations with clients or consumers in
California and would not compel any action or conduct of the business with regard
to conversations with non-California clients or consumers.”).
86. See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 356 (4th Cir. 2002)
(upholding state legislation implementing a nationwide tobacco settlement
requiring tobacco companies not party to the settlement to escrow certain monies
based on number of in-state sales and rejecting the extraterritoriality claim because
“Virginia’s qualifying statute . . . rather than aiming at or reacting to commerce
outside of Virginia, specifically limits its applicability to the sale of cigarettes
‘within the Commonwealth’” (citations omitted)); Morley-Murphy Co. v. Zenith
Elecs. Corp., 142 F.3d 373, 378–381 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying such a saving
construction to the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law); Hampton Feedlot, Inc. v.
Nixon, 249 F.3d 814, 819 (8th Cir. 2001) (construing the Missouri statute
prohibiting price discrimination in the buying of livestock to sales of livestock in
Missouri only); S.K.I. Beer Corp. v. Baltika Brewery, 443 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319–
20 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (refusing to apply the New York law regarding brewer–
wholesaler relationships to a contract for the sale of beer that took place outside
the state and noting that a contrary interpretation would present extraterritoriality
problems); Union Underwear Co., Inc. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Ky.
2001) (holding that Kentucky’s Civil Rights Act did not apply to an employer
whose headquarters were in Kentucky, when the acts giving rise to the lawsuit
occurred in another state) (“Imposing the policy choice by the Commonwealth on
the employment practices of our sister states should be done with great prudence
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IV. WHAT KILLED EXTRATERRITORIALITY?
In the space of a decade and a half, extraterritoriality went from
being a potentially robust limit on the power of states to extend their
regulatory reach into other states to a narrow limit on the power to
regulate prices in other jurisdictions. While it is not unusual for the
Court to announce a potentially sweeping decision or doctrine only
to retreat from its implications,87 it is a rare enough event that it
furnishes an occasion for reflection. So, the question arises: What
killed extraterritoriality or, at least, limited it significantly?
In this Part, I will argue that at least four factors contributed to
the doctrine’s demise. First, extraterritoriality as constitutional
doctrine suffered from what Kermit Roosevelt has termed
calcification. Second, the doctrine—especially as recharacterized in
Healy—lacked a limiting principle, a fact demonstrated by early
litigation over state regulation of the Internet. Concerns over
extraterritoriality’s sweep also surfaced during the short-lived
litigation initiated by state and local governments over gun
manufacturers’ distribution practices. Third, when the Court
clarified that the constitutional locus for its limits on state punitive
damage awards was the Due Process Clause, it deprived DCCD
extraterritoriality of a potential new role. Finally, the Court has
tended to limit, rather than expand, the DCCD generally in the years
since Healy, making the prospects for a revival of extraterritoriality
in a broad form rather dim. Because any one of these would likely
have been sufficient to limit the doctrine, the Court’s abandonment
of DCCD extraterritoriality could be said to have been
overdetermined.
A. “Constitutional Calcification”
Kermit Roosevelt has argued that what he terms “constitutional
calcification” can infect constitutional decision rules and warp
constitutional doctrine in harmful ways.88 In this Section, I argue
that DCCD extraterritoriality suffered from both “loss of fit” and
“calcification,” to employ Roosevelt’s terms. Both undoubtedly led
the Court to limit the doctrine, perhaps as a prelude to ultimately
abandoning it.

and caution out of respect for the sovereignty of other states, and to avoid running
afoul of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.”).
87. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), with Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
88. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1652.
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1. Loss of Fit
Roosevelt wrote that sometimes “decision rules that made sense
when adopted may lose their fit,” in which case “the Court will find
it necessary to change the decision rules.”89 For example, the Court
used to employ a rational basis test in scrutinizing gender-based
classifications.90 By the 1970s, attitudes towards the legitimacy of
gender-based classifications had changed, and the Court found it
necessary first to apply a more rigorous type of rational basis
scrutiny, then to replace it altogether with the more searching
intermediate scrutiny.91
Extraterritoriality suffered from a similar loss of fit. Recall that
the doctrine grew out of the Court’s attempt to sort permissible from
impermissible state regulations of interstate commerce by upholding
“indirect” regulations of interstate commerce and invalidating
“direct” regulations of it. Extraterritorial regulations of interstate
commerce were regarded as paradigmatically direct regulations,
exceeding the legislative jurisdiction of states.
But the Court no longer—and has not for some time—enforces
the DCCD using those decision rules. The key concept is now
whether a state or local law is discriminatory, not whether it directly
regulates commerce. Concerns that states have exceeded their
proper legislative jurisdiction are constitutional matters but ones
that, as Donald Regan suggested in his essay on the subject, are “not
. . . dormant commerce clause problem[s].”92 There are clues in
MITE and Healy that the Court itself recognized this, for in each the
Court furnished an alternative ground for its holding that employed
the Court’s contemporary DCCD decision rules.
The portion of MITE discussing extraterritoriality garnered only
a plurality, in contrast to the portion of Justice White’s opinion that
concluded the Illinois Act failed Pike balancing.93 The Act deprived
shareholders of the opportunity to proffer their shares at a premium
and the Court concluded that these costs were “clearly excessive”
when compared with Illinois’ asserted interests in regulating
resident shareholders and regulating the internal affairs of Illinois
corporations.94
89. Id. at 1686–87.
90. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948); Roosevelt, supra
note 6, at 1687.
91. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1688.
92. Regan, supra note 1, at 1873.
93. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“The
Illinois Act is also unconstitutional under the test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. . . .”).
94. Id. at 640, 644–46 (citations omitted).
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In Healy, as well, Justice Blackmun’s opinion held that the
Connecticut price affirmation statute discriminated against interstate
commerce on its face, in addition to having an impermissible
extraterritorial effect.95 “By its plain terms,” he wrote:
[T]he Connecticut affirmation statute applies solely to
interstate brewers or shippers of beer, that is, either
Connecticut brewers who sell both in Connecticut and in at
least one border State or out-of-state shippers who sell both
in Connecticut and in at least one border State. Under the
statute, a manufacturer or shipper of beer is free to charge
wholesalers within Connecticut whatever price it might
choose so long as that manufacturer or shipper does not sell
its beer in a border State. This discriminatory treatment
establishes a substantial disincentive for companies doing
business in Connecticut to engage in interstate commerce,
essentially penalizing Connecticut brewers if they seek
border-state markets and out-of-state shippers if they choose
to sell both in Connecticut and in a border State.96
Alternative grounds for the same constitutional claim would be
unnecessary had extraterritoriality been seamlessly integrated into
the Court’s existing two-tier DCCD standard of review.97
2. Calcification
Roosevelt termed the more serious doctrinal defect,
“calcification.”98 This occurs when “decision rules [are] mistaken for
95. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 340 (1989) (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 341.
97. As noted above, see supra notes 25–41 and accompanying text, there was
a loss of fit not only within the DCCD—between extraterritoriality and the
contemporary doctrine’s focus on discrimination and protectionism—but also a
loss of fit across other doctrines as well. Healy imposed greater limits on
extraterritorial state power under the DCCD at the same time that the Court was
relaxing restrictions on state power to regulate cross-border conduct in related
doctrines. Under the Due Process Clause, for example, the Court had concluded
that “minimum contacts” sufficed for states to exercise personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Similarly,
the Court concluded that a state need only demonstrate sufficient contacts that
create “state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair” in conflicts of law cases. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 313 (1981). Likewise, the Court had, by the mid-1970s, concluded that
interstate commerce could be taxed as long as the taxing state had a sufficient
“nexus” with the taxpayer, the taxes did not discriminate, the taxes were
apportioned, and the taxes were related to the services provided by the state.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1977).
98. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1693.
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constitutional operative propositions.”99 Consequences of
calcification include “ill-advised doctrinal reform, attempts to bind
nonjudicial actors to decision rules rather than operative propositions,
and an undoing of the benefits of decision rules.”100 Justice
Blackmun’s broad reformulation of DCCD extraterritoriality in Healy
suggests the principle was well on its way to calcification had the
Court not circumscribed the doctrine in Walsh.
It is important to remember that DCCD extraterritoriality was
itself a doctrinal subset of the direct–indirect decision rule that itself
was an attempt to implement another set of decision rules—namely,
Cooley’s distinction between national and local subjects. But the
Commerce Clause does not restrict states to the regulation of local
subjects or limit their power to indirect regulation of interstate
commerce. Nor does it expressly mandate territorial exercises of
state regulatory power. These were merely decision rules intended to
implement an inchoate sense that the Clause placed some judicially
enforceable limits on state power to regulate interstate commerce.
If, as I have argued elsewhere,101 the constitutional operative
proposition the DCCD is meant to implement is that states cannot
regulate interstate commerce in ways that endanger the national
political union the Constitution established, then it is not clear that
extraterritoriality decision rules are especially helpful or useful in
implementing that constitutional principle. Or at least the friction
generated by extraterritorial regulations of commerce does not seem
as potentially disruptive as the retaliatory cycles that discrimination
produces. Further, as the Court seems to have concluded in its
punitive damages jurisprudence,102 the Due Process Clause is the
more appropriate constitutional source for general limits on
extraterritorial regulation.103
B. Lack of a Limiting Principle: Two Case Studies
A second problem with DCCD extraterritoriality, at least with
Healy’s sweeping restatement of the doctrine, was its lack of a
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Denning, supra note 15, at 484–85.
102. See infra notes 134–139 and accompanying text.
103. See Felmly, supra note 1, at 508 (“[T]he similarities between the ability of
a state to assert jurisdiction over and pass legislation concerning individuals
beyond its borders have thus raised the question of whether the extraterritoriality
principle should be located within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (citation omitted)). Professor Regan famously concluded that while
extraterritoriality lacked a clear textual basis it was a structural principle inherent
in the federal system established by the Constitution. Regan, supra note 1, at 1887.
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limiting principle. Had the Court pressed Healy to its limits, DCCD
extraterritoriality could have become a significant restriction on state
regulatory power.
Justice Scalia’s Healy concurrence raised this concern.104
Labeling the extraterritoriality principle “both dubious and
unnecessary to decide the present cases,”105 Justice Scalia concurred
on the ground that the price affirmation act was discriminatory. “I
would refrain,” he wrote, “from applying the more expansive
analysis which finds the law unconstitutional because it regulates or
controls beer pricing in the surrounding States. . . . The difficulty
with this is that innumerable valid state laws affect pricing decisions
in other States—even so rudimentary a law as a maximum price
regulation.”106 He added: “I do not think our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence should degenerate into disputes over degree of
economic effect.”107
Between Healy and Walsh, the rise of the Internet (and state
attempts to regulate it) and municipal lawsuits against gun
manufacturers pointed up the consequences of enforcing Healy’s
sweeping version of extraterritoriality, causing scholars to question
its origins and application.
1. Internet Regulation
Academics like Glenn Reynolds raised early questions about the
ability of states, consistent with the DCCD, to regulate online
activity.108 On cue, a New York federal district court stymied an
attempt by the state to punish dissemination of pornography and
other material deemed harmful to minors over the Internet.109 Citing
cases from Baldwin to BMW, the Court concluded that the act had
impermissible extraterritorial sweep and enjoined its enforcement.
“The nature of the Internet,” the court wrote,
makes it impossible to restrict the effects of the New York
Act to conduct occurring within New York. An Internet user
may not intend that a message be accessible to New Yorkers,
but lacks the ability to prevent New Yorkers from visiting a
104. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 344 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
105. Id. at 345.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Virtual Reality and “Virtual Welters”: A Note on
the Commerce Clause Implications of Regulating Cyberporn, 82 VA. L. REV. 535
(1996).
109. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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particular Website . . . . Thus, conduct that may be legal in
the state in which the user acts can subject the user to
prosecution in New York and thus subordinate the user’s
home state’s policy—perhaps favoring freedom of
expression over a more protective stance—to New York’s
local concerns. New York has deliberately imposed its
legislation on the Internet and, by doing so, projected its law
into other states whose citizens use the Net. This
encroachment upon the authority which the Constitution
specifically confers upon the federal government and upon
the sovereignty of New York’s sister states is per se violative
of the Commerce Clause.110
Subsequent articles argued that the DCCD extraterritoriality posed
real problems for state regulation of the Internet.111 The American
Library Association case emboldened plaintiffs to challenge other
regulations, like those regulating the sending unsolicited email
messages (spam).112
But in an influential Yale Law Journal article published in 2001,
Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes threw cold water on the efforts to
apply broad DCCD extraterritoriality to state Internet regulation.
Their article was a powerful critique of the principle, as well.
Healy’s extraterritoriality principle, they argued, was “clearly
too broad. Scores of state laws validly apply to and regulate
commercial conduct that produces harmful local effects.”113 The
American Library Association court’s logic “would condemn an
extraordinary array of state laws as applied to cross-border activity
that no one heretofore viewed as problematic.”114 They pointed out
that “a state regulation of cross-border harms” with impacts “on outof-state actors cannot by itself be the touchstone for illegality” under
DCCD extraterritoriality.115 “State regulations are routinely upheld

110. Id. at 177.
111. See, e.g., Dan Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095,
1127–32 (1996); Kenneth D. Bassinger, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits
on State Regulation of the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV.
889 (1998) (concluding that the likelihood of inconsistent and conflicting state
regulations counseled in favor of exclusive federal Internet regulation). But see
James E. Gaylord, Note, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet: Letting
the Dormant Commerce Clause Lie, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1095 (1999) (arguing
against the application of extraterritoriality to state Internet regulation).
112. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 1, at 793–94 (describing early
challenges to state antispam laws).
113. Id. at 790.
114. Id. at 823.
115. Id. at 803.
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despite what is obviously a significant impact on outside actors.”116
By way of illustration, they noted that “[m]ultistate firms often face
[costs keeping up with multiple regulatory regimes] with respect to
varying state tax laws, libel laws, securities requirements, charitable
registration requirements, franchise laws, tort laws, and much
more.”117
Moreover, they argued that extraterritoriality was a poor fit with
the DCCD’s main focus: restricting protectionism among states.
“The protectionist concern,” they noted, “is not generally implicated
by the Internet pornography and spam cases,” which applied
evenhandedly.118 “Instead, the Internet cases implicate a . . .
problem presented by state regulation of cross-border
externalities.”119 Better, they concluded, that the burdens associated
with crossborder regulation of externalities be examined by
balancing the burdens with the local benefits—ordinary Pike
balancing, in other words.120
2. Municipal Gun Litigation
About the same time courts were applying DCCD
extraterritoriality to state Internet regulations, state and municipal
governments were suing gun manufacturers for engaging in
allegedly tortious marketing and distribution practices.121 The
manufacturers objected, claiming that the remedies sought,
including injunctive relief mandating changes in nationwide
marketing and distribution of their products, would have
impermissible extraterritorial effects.122 Success was decidedly
mixed. One court dismissed a suit on extraterritoriality grounds, but
the dismissal did not survive appeal.123 Some courts, though,
116. Id.
117. Id. at 804.
118. Id. at 798. See also Felmly, supra note 1, at 507 (observing that “the
extraterritoriality principle is not concerned with discrimination, protectionism, or
with the process of state legislation”); supra text accompanying notes 89–97.
119. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 1, at 798.
120. Id. at 806.
121. See generally Timothy D. Lytton, Introduction: An Overview of Suits
Against the Gun Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE
CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL & MASS TORT 1 (Timothy D. Lytton ed.,
paperback ed. 2006).
122. I, too, argued that the suits were vulnerable to an extraterritoriality
challenge. Brannon P. Denning, Gun Litigation and the Constitution, in SUING THE
GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 121, at 315, 339.
123. See City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45D05-005CT-243, 2001 WL 333111, at *6 (Ind. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2001) (“Defendants
suggest that the City’s lawsuit, in violation of the Commerce Clause, seeks to
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seemed to skirt the issue, either holding that the suits did not
constitute “regulation” implicating the DCCD at all,124 or that the
DCCD’s protections were not triggered by common law tort suits.125
The efforts to avoid application of the DCCD suggested the judges
were worried the doctrine might have some kind of bite.
The passage of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
preempted many of the state and municipal claims against gun
manufacturers,126 but scholars like Allen Rostron nevertheless
worried about the implications of a robust DCCD extraterritoriality
for a variety of state regulatory regimes.127 DCCD extraterritoriality,
he argued, was out of step with the retreat from a strict territoriality

regulate the lawful conduct of the defendants outside Gary’s borders, in their
production, distribution and sales practices. As such, the City’s proposed claim
and relief inevitably have an unconstitutional and extraterritorial effect.”), rev’d,
801 N.E.2d 1222, 1236–37 (Ind. 2003). But see City of Cincinnati v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) (rejecting the argument that a
municipal tort suit against a gun manufacturer seeking injunctive relief to force
changes in marketing and distribution of firearms did not constitute impermissible
extraterritorial regulation). See also New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F.
Supp. 2d 256, 285–86 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
124. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2003);
District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 656–58 (D.C. Ct.
App. 2005) (upholding the D.C. ordinance imposing strict liability in tort for
manufacturers of “machine guns” or “assault weapons” for injuries arising out of
discharge of weapons within the District in holding that no extraterritorial
regulation exists where the only “regulation” is the possible imposition of tort
damages).
125. Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d 245,
254–55 (D.N.J. 2000) (dismissing county complaint against gun manufacturers for
negligent marketing and distribution of handguns and expressing skepticism that
such suits might implicate the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine) (“The Court
finds that plaintiff’s claims in this case would almost certainly have a negative
effect upon interstate commerce, but also that there would undoubtedly be strong
local benefits involved if the county succeeded in stemming the tide of gun
violence within its borders.”).
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2006). See generally Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1140–41
(upholding PLCAA against, inter alia, claims that Act exceeded Congress’s
commerce power); Jenny Jiang, Regulating Litigation Under the Protection of
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: Economic Activity or Regulatory Nullity?, 70
ALB. L. REV. 537 (2007); Alden Crow, Comment, Shooting Blanks: The
Ineffectiveness of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 59 S.M.U. L.
REV. 1813 (2006); R. Clay Larkin, Note, The “Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act”: Immunity for the Firearms Industry Is a (Constitutional) Bullseye, 95
KY. L.J. 187 (2006–2007).
127. Allen Rostron, The Supreme Court, the Gun Industry, and the Misguided
Revival of Strict Territorial Limits on the Reach of State Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 115, 151–56.
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that had occurred in all other areas of American law.128 Cases like
Healy revived that restrictive model without offering clear
guidelines for its application.129
Rostron cautioned that the extraterritoriality arguments proffered
by gun manufacturers were “extreme” and that, “if accepted and
applied beyond the context of the gun litigation, would truly return
the limits on state authority to where they stood a century ago.”130
He continued:
In the end, there are no limitations that narrow the gun
companies’ argument and preclude it from applying equally to
all of the many cases in which courts adjudicate state-law
claims based on a defendant’s commercial conduct that occurs
wholly outside the state. Taken to its logical conclusion, their
argument applies even to a simple common-law tort claim for
damages brought by a private individual against an out-ofstate manufacturer of a product that caused an injury.131
Such extreme results, as he saw them, led Rostron to invite “the
Supreme Court [to] expressly disavow the statements in [MITE] and
Healy, which interpreted the Constitution as forbidding the
application of a state’s commerce statutes to conduct that takes place
wholly outside of the state’s borders but has effects within the
state.”132 As I have argued, this is precisely what the Court did in
Walsh.133
C. The Due Process Clause and Punitive Damages
Despite the tantalizing hints in BMW v. Gore that the DCCD
extraterritoriality operated to limit a state’s ability to impose
punitive damages on defendants for out-of-state conduct,134 the
Court’s next punitive damages case dropped all references to Healy
and the Commerce Clause, locating the limits in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In State Farm Mutual
128. Id. at 127 (“The strict territorial approach to the reach of state law
appeared to be dead as the last decades of the twentieth century began.”).
129. Id. at 134 (observing that the Court’s decisions “provided no clear
statement of . . . a distinction [between economic regulation and other forms of
state law] or any explanation about how exactly to determine what sorts of state
law should be subject to the strict territorial rule” (citation omitted)); id. at 140
(“The Supreme Court’s decisions have charted no clear path for other courts to
follow.”).
130. Id. at 151.
131. Id. at 156.
132. Id. at 172 (citation omitted).
133. See supra notes 74–86 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text.
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Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell135—decided the same
term as Walsh—Justice Kennedy declared that “[t]he Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of
grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”136 While
the Court noted that “[a] State cannot punish a defendant for conduct
that may have been lawful where it occurred” and that “as a general
rule . . . a State [has no] legitimate concern in imposing punitive
damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside
of the State’s jurisdiction,”137 the cases cited relied on the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Full Faith and Credit Clause, not the
Commerce Clause.
Four years later, in Phillip Morris, U.S.A. v. Williams,138 the
Court held that “the Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a
State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for
injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or . . . injury that it inflicts
upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.”139 In a
listing of cases supporting the proposition, BMW is clearly included
with others that root this principle in the Due Process Clause.
The Court’s pivot to the Due Process Clause in punitive damage
cases, along with its and other courts’ disinclination to embrace
broad sweep for DCCD extraterritoriality, left it stranded—a
doctrinal oxbow lake. The Court’s changing attitude about the
DCCD, moreover, leaves prospects for an extraterritoriality revival
rather bleak.
D. The Court’s Second Thoughts About the DCCD
The abandonment of DCCD extraterritoriality is of a piece with
a more general retreat from the DCCD by the Supreme Court. In
2003, when Walsh was decided, Justice Thomas announced his
intention never again to vote to invalidate a state law challenged
under the DCCD.140 Even Justice Scalia, a trenchant critic of the
135. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
136. Id. at 416 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 421. The Court also appealed to the “basic principle of federalism . .
. that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is
permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can determine
what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its
jurisdiction.” Id. at 422 (citation omitted).
138. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
139. Id. at 353.
140. Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 68 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to majority conclusion that milk pricing statute was subject
to DCCD review). See also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Ass’n v. Walsh, 538 U.S.
644, 683 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (approving majority’s decision to reject
DCCD claim against Maine drug price control plan and quoting Hillside Diary
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DCCD, does not quite go that far. He at least is willing on stare
decisis grounds to invalidate discriminatory laws or cases that are
indistinguishable from others the Court has decided. But Justice
Scalia has long argued that the Court ought never to engage in the
balancing of costs and benefits of nondiscriminatory laws.141
Justice Scalia’s campaign against the DCCD may be winning
some converts on the Court besides Justice Thomas. In 2007, for
example, the Court created a then-unknown exception to the
DCCD’s antidiscrimination principle for discrimination in favor of
public entities.142 The next term it applied that newly minted
exception to a state law offering preferential tax treatment to income
derived from bonds issued by the taxing state or its subdivisions.143
In the course of the latter case, Justice Souter, who authored the
opinion, called into question the continued viability of Pike
balancing, where nondiscriminatory laws burdening commerce have
those burdens weighed against the putative local benefits of those
laws.144 Since 2000, in fact, the Court has invalidated only one state
law under the DCCD: a law permitting the direct sale of locally
produced wine to consumers.145 Under the Roberts Court, only
Justices Kennedy and Alito seem willing to enforce the DCCD
wholeheartedly.146
This judicial hostility—or indifference—to the DCCD’s
established prongs, antidiscrimination and Pike balancing, strongly
suggest little appetite for reviving a branch of the DCCD that in
broad form had sweeping effects. While the Roberts Court is not
inclined to overruling prior cases outright,147 it is fair to conclude in

dissent). See also generally Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas and the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Anatomy of a Doctrinal Divorce (July 22, 2012) (unpublished
work) (on file with author).
141. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888,
897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that balancing interests is not possible
because the interests balanced are incommensurate: “It is more like judging
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”).
142. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330 (2007).
143. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 361–62 (2008). For a
critique of the exception, see Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The
“New Protectionism” and the American Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 247 (2009).
144. Davis, 553 U.S. at 338–39.
145. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
146. See, e.g., Davis, 553 U.S. at 362 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United
Haulers, 550 U.S. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting).
147. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010).
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light of Walsh and subsequent events, that DCCD extraterritoriality
is, for all intents and purposes, dead.
V. ON “INCONSISTENT STATE REGULATIONS”
Recall that one justification for continuing to enforce DCCD
extraterritoriality was that if state law was not cabined, interstate
actors would be subject to a skein of inconsistent, possibly
conflicting, regulatory regimes.148 A related fear was that one state
might establish a rule that was more strict than any other state’s rule
and that an interstate actor might comply with the strict rule, thus
permitting a single state to establish a de facto national standard.149
Undoubtedly, the Court has, in the past, held unconstitutional state
laws that imposed what the Court saw as conflicting and
inconsistent regulations.150
The question arises, then: What does the death of DCCD
extraterritoriality mean for these related “inconsistent state regulations”
cases? The answer has to be, I think, that nondiscriminatory, but
burdensome and perhaps conflicting, laws should be evaluated under
Pike balancing, with the evidence of conflicting regulatory regimes
used to prove that a law or laws are burdensome. Professor Regan put it
well when he wrote that “[t]he commercial enterprise that chooses to
operate in more than one state must simply be prepared to conform its
various local operations to more than one set of laws. The Constitution

148. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text.
149. So. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 773, 795 (1945) (invalidating state
train length law and noting that the alternative to breaking up trains at state borders
“is for the carrier to conform to the lowest train limit restriction of any of the states
through which its trains pass, whose laws thus control the carriers’ operations both
within and without the regulating state”).
150. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Trucking Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959) (invalidating a law requiring the use of contoured mudguards on trucks
when many other states required use of straight mudguards); Morgan v. Virginia,
328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (holding the state law requiring segregation of interstate
bus passengers unconstitutional). In Morgan v. Virginia, the Court wrote:
As no state law can reach beyond its own border nor bar transportation of
passengers across its boundaries, diverse seating requirements for the
races in interstate journeys result. As there is no federal act dealing with
the separation of races in interstate transportation, we must decide the
validity of this Virginia statute on the challenge that it interferes with
commerce, as a matter of balance between the exercise of the local police
power and the need for national uniformity in the regulations for
interstate travel.
Morgan, 328 U.S. at 386.
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does not give an enterprise any special privileges just because it
happens to operate across state lines.”151
Professors Goldsmith and Sykes agreed: “States are allowed to
make their own regulatory judgments about scores of issues. The
mere fact that states may promulgate different substantive
regulations of the same activity cannot possibly be the touchstone
for illegality under the dormant Commerce Clause.”152 They too
urged analysis of those cases under Pike balancing to guard against
the possibility that the “compliance costs” imposed by “nonuniform
state regulations” are “so severe that they counsel against permitting
the states to regulate a particular subject matter”153 or because the
“regulatory benefits . . . were illusory while the costs of complying
with the local regulation were severe.”154
CONCLUSION
Charles Fried has observed that the Court’s constitutional
doctrine often follows a common law model, whereby
particularistic decisions, moved by the force of urgent
specifics, may for a time exert their influence in a case-bycase accretion of precedents in similar circumstances, but
their influence cannot forever be exerted in this sideways
fashion. Eventually they either run out, or, if potent, they
invite courts to move to higher levels of abstraction, where
more general propositions are announced, and it is these that
begin to take over some of the work of deciding cases.155
DCCD extraterritoriality, it seems, was a doctrine potent enough
to move to that higher level of abstraction. It then stalled once the
Justices realized (1) that the doctrine was a poor fit with the larger
151. Regan, supra note 1, at 1881 (footnote omitted). To the extent that the Court
is doing something in Bibb other than balancing, Professor Regan argues that “if [a
per se rule against inconsistent state regulations] is alive and well, it is also limited to
transportation cases.” Id. at 1883. While he earlier argued that the Court should not
balance in what he termed movement-of-goods cases, he conceded that balancing
might be appropriate in transportation cases. “Transportation cases,” he explained,
“unlike movement-of-goods cases, involve a constitutionally significant interest that
arguably will not be adequately protected without judicial balancing. The interest in
question is the national interest in an efficient transportation and communications
network,” which is important “to the whole project of political union.” Id. (citation
omitted).
152. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 1, at 806.
153. Id. at 806–07.
154. Id. at 807.
155. CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT 189 (2004).
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DCCD, which focused on discrimination and protectionism rather
than whether a state law “directly” regulated interstate commerce;
and (2) the implications of taking the new rule seriously, as
illustrated by lower courts using it to thwart state regulation of the
Internet and litigants claiming that common tort remedies were
subject to its strictures. The Court’s decision to ground its punitive
damages decisions on due process principles and the general retreat
from the DCCD also contributed to extraterritoriality’s demise and
make prospects for its future revival unlikely.
As one who firmly believes in the utility of studying doctrinal
development and application in general,156 extraterritoriality’s demise
holds some larger lessons about the life cycle of decision rules. First,
decision rules are tools that aid the Court in rendering judgments.
Simply saying that the Constitution requires states to provide all
persons “equal protection of the laws” does not get one very far down
the road when deciding whether a state can prevent opticians from
making glasses without a prescription from an optometrist or
ophthalmologist157 or whether a state may extend preferences in
higher education admissions to certain underrepresented racial
groups.158 But decision rules have to be altered when the Court’s
understanding of the constitutional principles they implement change,
lest doctrine succumb to Roosevelt’s “calcification.” Once the Court
had shifted from its focus on direct versus indirect regulations to
discrimination, extraterritoriality no longer made any sense as a
dormant Commerce Clause decision rule.159 Yet it persisted, leading
to no small confusion in the courts as to DCCD extraterritoriality’s
scope.
On the other hand, the problem is largely self-correcting. The
Court can alter, amend, or even abandon decision rules when they
outlive their usefulness or become attenuated from the constitutional
principle they were created to serve. Perhaps, then, the more
important contribution of essays like this one is to encourage judges
and the Justices to approach the decision rules they create with more
156. See Brannon P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional
Scholarship and District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 TENN. L. REV. 789, 793–96
(2008) (making the case for careful study of the doctrine and decision rules
produced by courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court); see also Brannon P.
Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-evasion Doctrines in Constitutional Law,
2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773, 1815-33 (tying “anti-evasion doctrines” to the benefits
of studying doctrine more generally).
157. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
158. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
159. As to whether it should be regarded as a structural principle of federalism
or a due process problem, I express no opinion. Likewise, I bracket the question
whether the Court has become too lenient in permitting states to exercise judicial
and legislative jurisdiction in a variety of circumstances.
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intentionality in hopes of facilitating the creation of useful rules and
the communication of those rules to policy makers and lower court
judges. More importantly, the Court should not hesitate to prune the
rules that have lost vitality and whose existence confuses and
complicates doctrine to the detriment of constitutional law more
generally.

